> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.jolter.dev/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Security model

> Trust boundaries, transport, integrity, archive extraction, plugins, cache, and telemetry.

Jolter installs and executes developer toolchains. Its primary security goal is to prevent unverified network or archive content from becoming a published managed installation.

## Trust boundaries

Jolter treats these as untrusted input:

* provider metadata and HTTP headers;
* redirects and artifact URLs;
* downloaded archives and package tarballs;
* plugin release manifests and WASM artifacts;
* archive entry paths, links, permissions, and expanded size;
* project configuration and compatibility files;
* environment variables affecting storage, proxies, certificates, registries, and output;
* existing files under a writable `JOLTER_HOME`.

Official provider status does not bypass validation.

## Bootstrap boundary

The one-line installers execute code obtained from:

```text theme={null}
https://get.jolter.dev/install.ps1
https://get.jolter.dev/install.sh
```

That bootstrap is separate from Jolter's runtime and tool installer. Security-sensitive environments should download and review the script first or install a verified release archive.

## Transport and integrity

Jolter accepts only HTTPS metadata and artifact URLs. Redirect targets must remain HTTPS.

Runtime archives are verified with provider integrity data. Built-in tools require npm registry SHA-512 integrity. Optional Corepack-style hashes add another exact-version constraint.

Plugins verify release manifest identity, WASM size, and WASM SHA-256.

## Archive extraction

Extraction rejects:

* absolute paths;
* parent-directory traversal;
* unsupported entry types;
* unsafe parent symlinks;
* links escaping the staging root;
* excessive entry counts;
* excessive expanded size.

Extraction occurs in staging directories. Publication happens only after verification and payload checks succeed.

## Execution

Jolter does not execute downloaded runtimes or tools as part of installation.

Normal shims execute the runtime or tool selected by project resolution. `jolter doctor` may execute already-installed runtimes and tools with `--version` using bounded probes.

## Filesystem permissions

`JOLTER_HOME` should be writable only by the user or automation identity that owns it. Another principal with write access can affect future command execution.

Do not share one writable home between mutually untrusted CI jobs, repositories, or users.

## Telemetry

Jolter has no usage telemetry. Download progress is calculated locally from byte counts and elapsed time.

Commands can print local paths, provider names, versions, and environment-derived diagnostics. Review logs and JSON reports before attaching them to public issues.

## Non-goals

Jolter cannot protect against:

* a compromised operating system or Jolter binary;
* an attacker with write access to user executable paths or `JOLTER_HOME`;
* malicious code intentionally published by a trusted provider under valid metadata;
* arbitrary code run by a selected runtime, package script, project, or tool;
* secrets exposed by the shell, proxy, CI configuration, or logs.


## Related topics

- [Mental model](/mental-model.md)
- [Development](/maintainers/development.md)
- [Plugin security](/plugins/plugin-security.md)
- [Report a vulnerability](/security/reporting.md)